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1.

P03t-World War II Japanese politics have been marked
by the persistent dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party,
whose members are generally considered to uphoH conservative
policies.

~his

party with its several distinct factions has main-

tained control of the national government and the decentralized
governments from the Occupation period (1945-52) to the present
day.

In order to preserve their position, t. y have remarkably

withstood the democratization process imposed by Occupation policies upon tl::e Japanese nation.
The Occupation did possess the
physical ,ower, in its military
force, t, impose any reform it
desired, but as the Japanese
themselves did not desire them,
the reforms wouH inevitably
lapse as soon as the Occupation
pressure was removed.l
Reforms outlined by the Occupation forces involved a clear revision ot the political situation prior to the war with one goal
being the achievement ot political maturation throughout the
count 17 ..
Politically, the Occupation sought
to debar trom power the individuals
who had been responsibls for the
militaristic, ultra-nationalistic
and authoritarian character of the
Japanese nation and to encourage
the rise to power of more p~pularlJ
representatIve elements ••• M
Lxazuo Kawai, Japants American Interlude (Chicagot Ubiverslty of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 2$
2~., p.

24
1

2

This goal has been aChieved insofar as the Japanese have developed a strong parliamentary system of government still controlled
by conservative majorities that seem politically representative
of this developing

nation~

The salient feature of Japants government is the ro.
of parties in the political system and their determined etfort
to achieve power. f·'Japanese poli tics ••• has been

m~rked

in the

postwar period by the existence of • multi-party system~"3 although "it is tempting ••• to call the Japanese party sys tem a oneand-a-halt party system ••• n 4
conservative

The Liberal Democrats, representing

elements, have been the stalwarts of the government

tor they have aided in causing Occupation reforms whi. bolstering their own support even though revisions could considerably
have diminished their controlling position.

eyoshida's disin-

clination to bow before the shrine ot SOAP made him a reputed
bulwark of Japanese institutions aga\inst evangelical zealot the
alien reformer.m5
JSigmund Neumann~ Modern Political Parties (Chicago: Univer-

ot Chicago Press, 1956,-p.338.

4Robert Soalapino and Junn.suke Masumi, Parties and Politics
of contemporary Japan (Berkel.y~ University ot California Press,

11962,

p.79~

5Harold S. Quigley and John B. Turner, The New Japan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956.), p.2qO. Yoshida
was prime minister in parts of 1946 and 1941; and from October
1948 to December, 1954. His break in power during 1947-48 found
the Socialists gaining control of the prime ministership, the
only time that they have enjoyed such control to the present day.

~evival

"!n the

of political

eign influences intermingled.

Ea~ly

pa~ties

directives

aged new pa~ties and stimulated the o~!,6
t:oestablish new

fell

pa~ties

sho~t

Japanese and Forf~om

and Democrats, who

day LOP,

~eflected

seito

pa~ties

ties benefited

in that the only significant

to merge in

For example, the

1955

as the present-

the positions held by the Seiyakai and Min-

of the 1920's. Both the modern and the earlier parf~om ~ural

and business

has kept these conservative
processes.

we~e

encou~

Howeve~, the attempts

change was that the parties vested new names.
Libe~als

SOAP

pa~ties

suppo~t,

an advantage that

in control ot the government

Therefore, in the plethora of parties existing after

the war. many of the principles subscribed to were not altered.
although the increasing political interest of the people has demanded SUbstantial revisions and innovations in party politics.
The extent to which the

pa~ties

signified by their existing

have met this

powe~

in today's

transfo~mation

is

gove~nment~

Thus the designation of the Japanese party system of the ea~ly postwa1l" period as a multi-party system
requires SUbstantial qualification.
Two of the five national parties were
never critical or even vital facto~s
in the national scene."1 ~
This predicament has been protracted into the present
system where the Liberal Democrats continue to sustain their very
6~redith Cameron, Thomas H. Mahoney, and George E. McReynolds, China, Japan, and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press
Co., 1952), p.58q.
1~ealapino,

op.cit., P.

40

strong majority at the expense of a weak, but not powerless oppositlon.

During this entire post-Occupation period, the Social-

ist Party has represented the main opposition to the LOP, with
its strength (which has usually been approximately 30 to 35 per
cent) at times producing a two-party struggle.

However, "the

Socialists have never been able to break through the barrier that
separates them from two-thirds of the electorate.-a Dissent bred
by conflicting socialistic ideologies within their own ranks has
caused what seems to be a permanent split by the right-wing n.mocratic Socialists from the basically left-wing organization.
Basically unabl.) to consolidate their factional forces,
they remain

M• • • a

permanent minority, never even in power."9

However, this division within the Socialist ranks is actually basic to Japanese parties tor

* ... there

is not a single party in

Japanese history, except for the Communists, whioh has not been
the result of a merger or a spIlt of some kind. MlO

Moreover, the

merger involved in establishing the LOP has produced continued
suocess for their party, although they too are pressured by factional loyalty which could disrupt their strensth as the 1eadlng
party in Japanese politics.
~ealapino, op.cit., p.19.

-

9Ibid ... p.19.
lOChitoshi yanaga, Japanese People and Politics (New York.
John WIley and Sons, 19.56) p.239. The Japan Communist Party is
presently engaged in a rift over loyalty; whether they shou~ remain completely and solely allied with Moscow or Peking or establish oomparatively equal relations with both.

Japan does have a multi-party system including the LOP,
Socialists, Democratic Socialists, Korn.ito, and the Communist,
but it is more precisely " ••• a system ot loosely-structured tederations."ll Each party is

a conglomeration ot divergent and

distinct tactions, with their own particular leader (s) and goal.
These two tactors primarily

~oduce

any cohesiveness that a party

enjoys, thus £orcing national party organizations to depend UpoR
their continued

support~

This allows each £action to manipulate

their policies through the party ot their choice. Simultaneously,
they maintain a semi-autonomous nature even though specitically
attiliated with a party. Existenee ot this indigenous system is
necessitated by "factional loyalt.,. which tends to become the
primary loyalty, being

greater than that being given the tted-

eration t or any external group."12
Sinee 1945', the Liberal Democrats*, have automatically
received an overwhelming majority ot the rural vote with a minimum ot political communication.

This unique rural support has

reasserted i tselt ele ction after election, with the resultant
ettects ot enabling conservative candidates to compile excellent
voting records and to maintain their control ot government on all
levels.
- '.' llscalapino, op. cit., p.79.
12Ibid., p.79.
*From the war to November, 195'5', today's Liberal Democrats
were two distinct groups: Liberals (known in 1948 as Democratic
Liberals) and Democrats (known in 1947 and again in 195'4 as the
Japan Progressive Party).

6
Approximately 49 per cent ot the
Japanese electorate may be classitied in the rural or agrarian
categories, although many should
be placed in the mixed or agrarian related categories rather than
in the pure tormer designation. l 3
By controlling this heavy rural vote, which 1s currently diminishing, the LOP's struggle to acquire and exercise power has be.
greatly facilitated.
bem-tactor

or

The main reason that the LOP has been the

this rural vote is that they have stood tor con-

servatism and thus received support consequential to peculiar
traditional traits tound in rural areas o
By exploiting these traditional socio-political traits,

traits which one writer terms " ••• discreditable vestiges ot an
outmoded or 'Asian t or 'teudal' past which should be given speedy
burial,"14

Liberal Democrats have been provided with electoral

means to enforce a new conservatism.
In the early 1900's, conservatism
means something tar ditterent trom
what it meant only two decades earlier. It does not stand tor: emperor worship ••• subjugation ot
wom.n ••• omnipotence ot male head in
tamily •••• conomic control by the
zaibatsu ••• single party system •••
militarism and agression.15

i~calapino, op.cit., p.07.
l4R.E. Ward , "Political Modernization and Culture in Japan,"
WOrld Politics, XV (July, 1963), P.$90o
l5Jobn M. Xaki, Government and Politics in Japan (New York:
Fred.rick &. Praeger, 1962), p.t62

7
Although their conservatism is not the status-quo type since the
are entangled ina country developing and maturing politically,
they still balance programs directed toward a more independent
country and preservation of economic democracy.

To accomplish

this they must maintain the rural vote, even if their Diet* members do not represent agricultural interests.
~not

For one thing,

much more than one-titth ot the conservative Diet members

today have their primary attiliation with agriculture. nIb

Since

the LOP wishes to keep control ot the Diet because it is their
source ot power as a political party, it 1s to their advantage
to exploi t the "comf'ortable cushion ot

pt.

ssive support"!17 which

modern conservatism reserve. from tarmers and rural inhabitants.
The Japanese political system has matured to the extent
that "political power has come to depend on the votes ot the
torate,nl8

ele~

ot which a large percentage consistently votes con-

servative (or tor the LOP).

Theretore, continuation of a consetv

ative pattern of government has been easily accomplished with the
definite support supplied by the rural areas to tne Liberal Democrats, who are still averting the political maturation ot Japan
lbScalapino, op.cit., p~b8
17H.H.Baerwald, ·'Pac tional Politics in Japan, It Current History, XLVI (April, 1964), p. 226.
l8Xawai, op.cit., p. 126.
*Japan's national Diet has a bicameral organization: The
lower House ot Representatives (4b7 members) and the upper House
ot Councilors (250 members). S'ince the Liberal Democrat. have
always strongly elected majorities to both houses, they have been
able to control the selection ot the prime minister, who has always been a conservative except tor KAtayama (Socialist) in 1947.

8

by the traditional vote and by becoming a more representative
party for the entire nation.
Japanese voting records signify incredible success of
conservative candidates at the polls.

The most outstanding result

of their being elected to office is that they have developed a
mwinner" psychology.

Bven though their total popular vote has

been declining, they continue to control the national legislature
and other assemblies.

In what appears to be an unalterable situ-

ation, the Socialist Party stagnates in its minority role, unable
to lift it.elf into power.

It seems to have accepted the fact of

LOP polItical predominance, a realization which aggravates theIr
already disruptive nature among their tactions.

Without

necessa~

coordination, the Socialists have not maintained a definite party
policy program and have forcibly resorted to verbal attacks on
LOP programming.

The Socialist role has become too negative-

their party too inconsistent-and their hopes for power too diminutive.
.Augmenting the large rural support of the LOP is its
linkage to several particular business groups, which are national
in organization but whose support is most effective among smaller
affiliations usually found in urban areas.

Big business is the

financier ot the LOP and the reward tor their support has been
illustrated in the

f~vorable

legislation put forth by the party.

This makes bUsiness. unlike the rural backers who are not fully
rewarded for their support, a most powerful element in Japanese
politics.

9
Thirdly, the LOP incumbents in the national legislature
have one peculiar characteristic: many of them are former bureaucrats, experienced in a particular area of government, and cognizant ot the political power that the LOP posaesses_

It is common

for a bureaucrat to retire from the rigors of the administrative
battlefield when he reaches 50 years of age {a very general

ru~

and immediately find his way back into the legislative process
through party politics.

This experienced bureaucratic element

also tends to be conservative, thus giving the LOP a practice
area for their future members.
In sum, "the conservative predominance in Japan is the
product of a triple alliance between the bureaucracy, key national
interest groups
the LDP."19

many of which are affiliated with bu.iness, and

"The new power elite of Japan

consist. in a combi-

nation ot ••• rising entrepreneur•••• top level bureaucrat •••• poli ticians representing ••• business and bureaucrats ."20

FUrthermore,

even though the LOP receives such astounding rural support, the
government seems to be involved in promoting particular policies
of the triple alliance, none of which entail. the true public interest.

"There seems to be no agency which serves as the defende
of the public interest ••• ft2l "Japanese politics have been condi-

19seal apino, op.cit., p.93.

w.

20Ardath W. Burks, The Government of Japan (New York: Thomas
Crowell Co., 1961), p. 11
2lNobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (New York: Albert A.Knopf,

11957), p.286.

10
tioned much more directly by economic and social realities ••• "22
envisioned mainly by the bureaucracy and various Diet members.
Nevertheless, politioal parties are not beginning to overshadow
both the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, accepting growing demands
for governmental productivity.

people are finding them promising

rather than puerile.
The Japanese political system is definitely maturing,
although it still is not
terest.

trul~

representative ot the public in-

A unique aspe et ot this situation is the strong backing

or the LOP candidates by the eonservative rural areas, although
they are

the'~'~least

represented in national party policies.

The

opposing parties have not really permeated the strict traditional
barriers ot the rural areas.

To truly understand this political

situation, exploration ot rural socio-political determinants combined with their relationship to the ascending order governmental
levels i. expedient.

B~

evaluating buraku and village political

partiCipation, the solid"ltUljorit,. wh1c h the LDP has possessed on
all levels ot government oan be explained..

As the Japanese nati

matures in its politic.l knowledge, the conservatism or these
areas will be all-important to the survival or conservatism in the
nation and the continuing rule or the Liberal Democratic Party.
22Yanaga, op.cit., p.89.

CHAPl'ER IT

THE BURAKU AND GROUP COHESIVENESS
The foundation for traditional Japanese conservatism is
found in the buraku.

~ ••• The

buraku is an indigenous natural group

operating on the ba.i. of traditional mores ••• • 2 3

It

~plays

a

more immediate role in the daily lives of a larger proportion of
the Japanese people than any of the more formal and better mown
units ot organization,"24
structure of rural

and has been called the *most important

Japan.~25

The buraku i. not a legal political

entity which makes it an autonomous area with little need for political

management~

The buraku usually consists of a number. of very closelyknit families, otten related by kinship, constituting a household

l!.

"The family unit that most frequently forms the basis of bu-

~

organization today il the

household~

a group of relatives us-

ually embracing two or more conjugal families of different genera tions. lli26 Seldom, if ever, n,••• does any man, woman, or child th
23XUrt Steiner, Local Government in Japan (Stanford: Stanford
University Pres., 1905), P.207.
24A.R. Radcliffe-Brown in Suye MUra, A Japanese Village (Chicago, 1939) by John F. Embre& as quoted by steIner, p.zo1.
25aobert B. Ward, ~The Socia-Political Role of the Buraku
(Hamlet) in Japan,~ American Political Science Review, XLV (1950),
p.) 1025.
2osteiner. op.oit., p.2l0.

11

12

ot himself or another person apart from his role as a member of
his house. The ie looms above the individual.~27

No matter what

one is involved in, " ••• the family is always the prime constituent
element ••• ft28

With this reinforced rigidity enveloping its com-

position, it becomes quite difricult for an outsider to penetrate
the walls of the buraku or for outside influences to be attractive
or known by the people.

This group-enforced blockade surrounding

the buraku people has rendered this area particularly susceptible
to conservatism and group consciousness, two elements which complement each other, for the same traditionalism which sustains
conservative attitudes within each individual also controls group
behavioral patterns o
The Japanese tamily

ft • • •

has a hierarchical structure

at the pinnacle of this structure •• ~which may be thought ot as
pyramidical in shape, stands the male head of the tamily .. ft2 9 This
patriarchal affection has been the basis for Japan's one. native
ideal-that ot kokutai.

The kokutal concept involved the nation

until 1945 in emperor worship, for- the emperor- was 1x> the nation
what the father was to the tami]y.

Today, the emperor's position

is defined in Article 1 of the 1947 constitution: "The emperor
shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity of the people."
27Richard K. Beardsley, John W. Hall. and Robert E. Ward,
Village Japan (Chicago, University of Chicago Pr-ess, 1959), p.216.
(Tfiis is a stud,. of Niilke, a village in the Okayama prefecture.
28steiner, op.cit., p.210
29Ike,

~.cit.,

p.18

1),

The Japanese tather has never symbolically held his position but has rather maintained a patriarohal predominance as an
actual sooial t orce within the buraku.

It is to him that alleg-

iance is due; it is he who partially develops the political thinking of his wite and children. For example:
While the household with the father
as head is clearly the fundamental
uait ot the social and economic lite
ot Niiik8, the collectivity ot household. i. itself an integral communal
entity. When acting .s a political
unit, the people ot Niike reter to
themselves as buraku.30
People ot the buraku are further bound by an understanding of group consciou.ness.

"Since the Japanese live in closely-

knit groups and in a ctual physical proximity •.•• they think, act,
and live as a group."31 It is somewhat like the small American
village where everyone seems to know all about any local topic.
In Japan, it is paramount to perform and think exactly as the
others do.

The village group is considered tar more important

than the individual.
Each buraku individually selects a headman known a s the
"buraku

~~)2

for the community. His duty involve. overseeing the

activities ot the buraku, reporting important movements and decisions occuring ift the immediate a rea, a nd consulting with important local people on certain stand. to be supported.
JOBeardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit.,. p.248.
31Yanaga, op.eit., p.43.
32steiner~

op.cit., p.2ll o

His job i.

basically a part-time activity, unwanted except by those who are
local favorites or by those who exhibit a reoognized desire for
leadership.
How does the headman maintain cohesiveness and compatability in the buraku?

He actually does nothing because the Japa-

nese peopB have Qtraditional notions of harmony ••• reflected in
the manner in whioh decisions are made at the buraku meetings. Q33
This traditional principle is known as wago.
among ourselves.~34

~It

rejects

quarrel~

Replacing elements of debate are norms prac-

ticed to achieve a compromise evolving into consensus.
"The traditional means of taking group decisions in Japan is by the joint techniques of recommendation (suisen) and consensus."35 The Japanese seem to have a strong distaste for argumentation;, they prefer to have a smooth compromise because their
social propinquity all but commands it.
In relating

~

to the political arena, this element

has found acceptance asa "necessary ••• political modus vivendi."36
To what matters does the buraku assembly apply these techniques ot
decision?

Formally, they are very simple and of narrowly local

significance.

~heir

moat important function ia the selection of

33steiner, op.cit., p.216.
34Ike, op.cit., p.59.
35Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., P.15~.
36Yanaga, op.cit., p.45

buraku offioers, a headman, and vice-headmen. "37
a shared attitude through
remains.

consultation~

B,. establishing

no real oounter-argument

Eaoh individual in the buraku relies on those selected

through oompromise or outright unanimit,. to extend the element of
wago into the seleotion of local political candidates. Through
wago and its oorollary, oonsultation, Protessor Yanag. points out
that:
••• this attitude ••• underlies the
practice of stre •• ing accept~
bilit,. as the decisive criterio.
in the choice of political leaders. This has the effect invariably of narrowing down the choice
to the least objectionable, rath~r
than the most desirable person.3 tl
Those people influential within the

~~

have some social statu8

which serves as a :cI.eterminant in electing these people to buraku
positions.

S'ince they primarily control the wago process through

oonsultation, their deci.ion will beoome the enveloping rule for
the people. '!he main eftect ot suoh a condi tion i. that the people.
vote en masse tor the sante oandidates. Wh,.?

Because it the bu raktl

leader. have determined to vote for a oertain candidate, whether
it be tor the national legislature, pretectural assembly, or even
village assembly, they must follow the consensus in the buraku.
Failure to do so could reBul t in social·- ostracism,

~

hachibu.

One writer has hypothesized that "perhaps the most indigenous contribution of Japan to the soienoe ot government la,.
jTaeardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.355.
38Yanaga, op.cit., p.85.

16
in the

highl~

developed system of discussion, adjustment, consen-

sus and joint responsibllity."39

This may be true on the national

or prefectural level, but in the buraku "the farmer's traditional
attitude toward polities has had no positive or responsible part
to pla~ in the public decision-making proe••• ,"4o which involves
selectic. of candidates.

Politically, an individual does not trtil

pOises. a leparate role; instead one's political activities "are
.arried out within some group context."4l

Ultimately, those who

can vote are required to exercise their right to do so, and additionally, they must liken their votes to those of the entire
buraku.
To expose these political behavioral patterns fUrther,
transfer of these voting habits to village elections is necessary.
Why?

In village elections, "each buraku desires to obtain as man

seats in the assembly as is
it. votes."42

possib~.,

considering the .umber ot

mrhe chance for this is best if the numbers of can

didates equals the number of seat. it can obtain it all voters
vote for these candidates.~43 Often~ people who are village lead~
39Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow. eda., Political
Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton trnIversi
PreiS, 1964), pp.75-6.
40Beardlley, Hall, and Ward, op.oit., pp.44l-2.
4 I Y.Kuroda, "Political Role Attributes and Dynamics in a Ja
anese Community," public Opinion Quarterly, XXIX {Winter, 1965-6CJ,
p.bI3.
4 2steiner, op.cit., p.4l0.
43Ibid., p.4l0
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in government hold predominant positions in their respective buraku.
*In effect the

~uraku

resident votes traditionally for

a representative of his ~ur.ku in the village assembly."44

This

has three peculiar effects on the political prooe.s: oampaigning
reaches a low ebb in buraku bailiwioks since it is unnecessary;
competition will be highly unlikely, and party affiliation becom.
superfluous in the election prooess.

"The village governments es-

tablished by the Looal Autonomy Law may best be desoribed as miniature semi-parliamentary systems, evolving primarily about the
offices and interrelationship of a village assembly and a mayor~5
"Local autonomy on the village level requires that the inhabitant.
consider the village government as 'their government; that they
do not shrink back from it but participate in it. "46

In order to

use village government as a tool to implement certain buraleu ideas
or programs, the leaders must stand behimd a oandidate whom they
trust and

who.e chances of winning remain praotically beyond a

a doubt should all traditional determinant. be functioning.
Caapaigning is actually unnecessary in running for village office frequently because advanoe oaloulation of candidates
44s'teiner, op.cit., p.2~lOo
45Beardsley. Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.360. Village governments as established by law are the lowest regular units of regulatory public organization. A mayor and a village assembly manage their operations.
4 6steiner, op.cit., p-.226
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are so accurate that no election is necessary.

~In

the election

of town and village mayors ••• the ratio of candidate to position
was 2.0 in 1947, 1.9 in 1951, 1.8 in 1955, and 1.9 in 1959."47
If any app,eal be necessary, the ca.ndidate should petition the collectivity rather than the individual in the community. Such an sppeal ~is in line with traditional mores."48 "Active campaigning
remains not only superfluous but also slightly improper in the
eyes of tradition-bound villagers."49
With this directive to attain resu1ts of the election
prior to 'Voting day, compe ti tion oan be eliminated through a.cknowledged support for a oertain candidate. The deoision on voting
procedure is regulated through the buraku channels where the candidate to be supported holds a oonsensus vote.
~the

AS a general rule,

average villager wants a man of maturity and dignity, poses-

.ed of a. many of the traditional 3apanese virtues as possible.
High among these ranks sincerity (mokato), politene.s, and a humane interest in the problems of his rellows."50

When there i.

competition for a village office and no one candidate s •• ms to
have a definite majerity, alliance. of individual burakus may be
made. Through this process, one candidate may likely achieve a
leading position still subject to direct challenge. However, the
47s,teiner, op.cit., po391o

48Ibid.,

-

p.377o

49Ibid., p.211.
50Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.365.

19
prinoipal reason ror avoiding this partioular situation is that
ttthe buraku vote will be split and all the chances ror maximum
representation will be dlminished. tt 5l
and village a.semblymen

i~

'''••• 12 per cent or all t<nm

1955 and 7.2 per cent in 1959 were se-

lected ••• without any oppesition •••Thu. the system dees not work
to perrection ••• but it works well enough to keep the competition
ration extremely 10w."52
Granted praotioally unanimous suppert aDd lacking any
true competition, a oandidate has no r.al need to b. party-arriliat.d. ORee h. is elected to a village orri •• and desires to ascend the governmental scale, ha may the. turn to a party for additio:nal support, ir the part.y does not first appeal to him for
control of the vote he can

pro~ •••

Even with this opportunity,

" ••• most candidates do net appeal to any particular interest that
transoends buraku lIme.; it is only natural that most or them are
pure independents. 1t 53

And being independents, the people In the

buraku are denied .ven a glimpse or the demooratic political prec
••••• which are clearly a part or the heavier-populated areas.
But, this situatio. is partially fostered by their
challenge traditional line. o
In such a taut, tradition-bound area

a.

OIft

refusal to

the buraku, can-

tinued emphasis placed upo. traditionalism aids those

candidates

tabbed as conservatives. In the electoral process, many candidates
51 stein.r, op.eit., pp.4l0-ll.
52Ibid., p.4111
53Ibid., p.4l3
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for localeffice rult as i.dependent. ,. with mest ot them being con.ervative candidates.
dependent~

"Tft the 1955 e~ctions, ot some 43,168 ~in

ca.didate •••• 7.5 per cent had Socialist orientations ••

maRY were conservative •• ~54

Since the buraku people are conserv-

ative and the otficials they elect tend to be likewise, Wllque sup
port is rendered to the LOP. Over and above this contribution USs
the fact that personality is tar mere important than party which
di.tillguishes the individual's over-all donation to buraku c ...erv
atis. from just that ot the buraku preper.

III beiRg elected to a

village post, tor example, a person normally has the backing of a
number of burakus,which become a definite support organization
he can depend upen.

These conservatives in the villages and the

hamlets have a collective bloc of votes to be utilized either by
themselves as independents or by a national party faction of the
Liberal Democratic Part yo
summarily, the socio-political determinaat ot wago hal
caused the buraku pe.ple to be involved ift conservative loyalty

t. per.onality, rather than complete participation in govermmeat
and polities.

Protessor Maki concludes: " ••• the Japaaese iadiv-

idual has already de •• nstrated that he is capable ot acting as a
respeKaible oiti~elt under democracy.~55 This seems quite uareasenable it oae scrutinizes the rural political picture.
54Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, ep.cit., p.407
55Maki, op.cit., p.128 o

~rofessor
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Maki believes that the Japanese individual:
•• oexercisel the right of suffrage;
he is interested in controversial
issues ot both pelitics and governmeat;- he is oapable ot criticizing
political leaders, parties, and procedures; he is vitally eoncer~ed with
the maintenance of the democratic
processes aad structure that have
given concrete be.efits.56
Urban votera, who are more independent and politically refined,
tit the Protellor's description;- but, the individual enclosed by
buraku traditioaali.m lacks positive i!'lvolvement in pelities te
the exteat that he i. apolitical outside ot exercising hi. right
t. vete.

The buraku individual's connection to government is nen.

existent because he does taot participate. ttIJn Niiike 8.lld Kamo,
government continues to be regarded as something that is done t.
ud for rather than by the SNerage citizen o ft 57

Voting in blocs

as the singular political activity of the buraku people does not
prove their political responsibility because this is practiced
mechanically.
5 6waki, op.cit., p.128.
57Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.~03.

CHAPTER III
OBLIGATIONS AND POLITICS
A second socio-political determinant primarily unique
in rural politics is

oyabun-kobun~

a system of obligational rela-

tionships "based upon simulated patrimonial principles. It 58

It is

a system of perpetual obligations, as loyalty to superiors, imposed upon people through their natural interaction with otherso
Regarding politics, alignment of voter support through these obligational relationships enables a candidate to secure definitive
backing external to particular party affiliation.
establish a myriad of these relationships through

Bureaucrats can
pro~otion

of

legislation in the Diet advantageous to certain groups of people.
As repayment for this cooperation, the affected group obligates
itself to accept the role of kobun by accomodating the bureaucrat
with a promised favor.
Relatioi!.lships of this nature are entirely unattainable
wdthout norms to describe the obligation to be fulfilled.
particular norms are two 2:

~

These

and giri •. "The word for obligations

which cover a person's indebtedness from greatest to least is
on. tt 59

Life according to these norms is a perpetual accumulation

of successive favors demanding reimbursement. If'To an Occidental,
5 8t ..ao Ishino and John W. Bennett, "The Japanese Labor Boss
Sys teuP (The Ohio state Unt versi ty Research Foundation" 1952), p.l
as cited in Ike's, Japanese Politics~ op.cit., p.26o
59Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1946), p.99.
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giri includes a most heterogenous list of obligations ranging fro
gratitude tor an old kindness to the duty of revenge."60

Giri h

two additional divisions: " ..... giri to the world ... one's obligation
to repay

~

to one's

tellows~ ••

and giri to one's name ••• the duty

of keeping one's name and reputation ••• ~6l
Within the buraku community a child has on to his
for his being brought lmto the world.

fa~

What remains of this patlB

in the buraku is used to bolster the traditional conservatism obstructing political maturation.

How can this be accomplished'

If a child is disallowed the opportunity to perceive political
modernization through coercive devotion to the group and endless
indebtedness provoked through fundamental interaetion, he will develop the same apathetic concern for government still persistent
in rural communi ties

0

Urban areas are

p'ractical~y

devoid ot these

peculiar determinants due to their accent on individuality and
definite conoern for the political processes ot the nation.
Furthermore, shou1d the individual Japanese citizen obtain tavors trom other individuals who eventually run for political
office, repayment in the form ot a vote becomes very accessible.
Recogmd_ihg that he has a definite duty to tulfill to his oyabun
and a supplementary obligation to vote with the group, only one
choice is available even if there is keen competition. Thoughtful
voting cannot be exercised so long as the individual citizen does
OOsennett, op.cit., p.133
6lIbid.,. p.l34.

not participate in a mature political system•

.2!!

and giri con-

stantly reinforce the dutiful reciprocation binding an individual
to the oyabun (superior), and thereby forbidding escape should
the matter of voting be introduced as a mode of repayment.
The Liberal Democratic

p~ty

has exploited this deter-

minant since 1955 when the Liberals and Democrats merged.

There

is no doubt that through their success in attaining political office as a factionaliaed party they have undertaken the establishment of a branched party organization, one which includes tapping
rural obligational relationships and inaugurating similar
on much higher levels.

patt~s

Instead of simply relying upon the vote

they will receive from traditional

supporters~

the party has de-

centralized its organization
in order to take greater advantage
•
of this peculiar situation. although concentration of real local
power is still held by factional leaders and their organizations.
The experienced politician may be an oyabun within a
certain group. And within each other group, this same

~oss-henCh

men"62 relationship may prevail, with competition among entire
groups to infuse additional groups not as strong as they. Groups
" ••• seek to bind one another in complex alignments and contractural obligations ramifying in various direotions so that they form
an overlapping and interlocking web."63

~2Kawai, op.cit., p.115.
63Ibid., p.115.

What has been establi~
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is an G"yabun-kobun interrelationship emending through the amalgamation of various obligational groups.

"The man who fares best

in this type of system is one who can subtly take advantage of
the constantly shifting balance of power among these interacting
groups to maneuver his group to the top."64"Wlth an important
political leader managing an obedient clientele or offering inducements to those who join his ranks, it is not surprising that
the parties have become faction-ridden in the mad scramble for
power and advantage."65
Rural areas are much easier to control through the decentralized process because"' ••• the passivity of the peasant ••• and
the tendency of basic

toward political solidarity

social'~'units

invites the control of huge blocs of votes by knowledgeabla and
influential leaders in the community.'tr66

These influential people

are in tUrn pledged to another superior.
The LOP has recognized a break down of the traditional
oyabun-kobun relationships and is

tt' •••

trying to replace them in

part by recruiting popular support for local chapters. It67

Re-

placing them are more extensive support organizations which have
less emphasis on the obligational norms found in the traditional
system. One basic reason for this modern development is that "the
64xawai, op.cit., p.115
65Quigley and Turner,

op.~it.,

66Ibid., p.268.
67xawai, op.cit., p.l29.

po357.
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new generation of political leaders haven't had time to develop
oyabun-kobun to a great extent.-o8
Another reason for the diminishing influence of oyabunkobun is that issues are increasingly becoming the foeal point of
political interest in Japan.

Although this is a recent movement,

it is spreading through the decentralized bailiwicks and currentl
promising to penetrate the rural interterence generated by traditional socio-political traits.

Moreover, the extent to which is-

sues are gaining priority in villages and burakus could make them
the pioneering
patterns.

e~ment

in the expunging of traditional political

Where other parties have not diffused their organiza-

tions as have the Liberal Democrats or lack factional power controls as the LOP possesses, conservative elements should continue
as the pattern for rural voting.

Expanding the currents of oyabun

kobun into local branch organizations presides as a progressive
movement in the conservative, grass-roots level of Japan. However,
any success enjoyed by any party's local branches still depends
upon support levied by 10ca1 leaders.
68Kawai, op.cit., p,.l28.

CHAPrER IV
THE JIBAN: POWER POLITICS

Competition for government office is the highlight of
political interest in most nations maintaining two party or

mul~

party sys tems. Incumbents seek'·as much organized support as needed
to assure re-election. Accomplishement of this goal relies on the
political record advanced by the incumbent and the persuasive and
dedicated contributions made by party members.

Rival parties con

done policies they hope are accep,table to the pe ople; elected officials execute party policies while pursuing personal programs
~erived

from their own political beliefs and the demands of their

constituencies and interest groups. This would seem to constitute
a general perspective for most political struggles among parties
in securing voter support..

To some extent this can be verified

,

in Japan's political system, unless one discerns the rural villages and hamlats, where political competition has been negated
through traditionalism.
Japanese voters explicitly associate themselves with
personalities rather than party in rural communities. Burakuahave
their 3personality consensus" fortified by wago and the norms of
~

and

~iri.

Urban areas. where a rising middle class enjoys some

individuality in

votihg~

has not shown significant changes when

It comes time to wote ; personality is still. the basic cri teriOR,
not party or program.

This reinforces the traditional ]eader-fol-

lowe.r systemization of the rural areas which now comprise the faun
datlons for support organizations of national party candidates.
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Organizing support for high govemmental office is a personal endeavor, one which depends upon traditional patterns to stabilize
one's control of the vote. The political machine conclusive of
this declared support is entitled a jiban.
"One

MUS

t understand firs t that a

jiban is a personal,

not a party appurtenance. It is gained, belongs to, a nd is lost
by an individual politician. 't09

"The primary goal of an organi-

zation of this type is the deliver of votes particula rly in prefectural and national elections."70

A jiban organiz.ed by a rural

leader is apt to be dependent upon traditional traits rather than
any personal

organi~tional

aim.

Maintaining the jiban necessi-

tates cooperation with certain influential men, yuryokusha.

~se

'influential' persons on the buraku leval form the smallest mesh
in a network that stretches

u~ards

from a rural consti tuency .. t1 71

to the prefectural politician

outside of these influential men"

jiban is a ither unobtainable or very unstab'B. Therefore, proper
care must be placed in placating the yUryokusha
Older local politicians have a definite edge in controlling a jiban. "'Japanese voters are invariably attracted to name
and face so that an obscure candidate stands a very small chance
of winning even if he is able to put forth a worth-while political
campaign. "72

Applying the controlled vote a jiban represents, a

69Beardsley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.425
70Ibid." po426.
71steiner, ~~., p.432.
72Yanaga,

0

.cit., p.296
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known looal politioian overoomes threats of oompetition with praotioally no effort.
platform.

This can be accomplished without a poli tiea!

Younger political aspirants are frequently unable to

supplant the jiban of a favored incumbent unless they have succeeded in building one of their own. However, "young politicians
and newcomers who have not yet succeeded in building a

~iban •••

find it to their advantage to run in electoral districts with a
heavy

f

floating I vote, --73 where they will be unlikely confronted

with staunch support organizationso
PrefectUres are the principal, large-scale political
divisions of Japan.

From these 46 bailiwicks, 150 of the 250

members of the House of Councilors are elected, a s are the critical members of the prefectural assemblies.

At this level of gov-

ernment, jiban is currently being propagated with great enthu8iasm.
"The jiban of the prefectural politician ••• has no aprlo;l
existence. It consists of a

nu~r

of towns and villages that do

not form m. unit in the consciousness of the inhabitants, and tha::
may indeed, have con.flicting interests and other causes .for antagon1sm."74

Personalism retains its primary position as the back-

bone for support, yet it is less

stab~

for the pre.fectural pol-

itician. In composing a jiban, a prefectural candidate takes advantage of the following he has attracted in local politics, if
73Ike, op.cit., p.208.
74steiner, £E.cit., p.434

30

he has such experience.

This following is characterized by per-

sonal loyalty to several other individuals whom the prefectural
assembly candidate should exploit.

If the candidate can claim

this' web of voter support, he is capable of effecting local elections and offering his vote support to • national party for national

e~ctions.

The Japanese political process also accentuates

the position of the prefectural assembly candidate for Min all elections, the candidates who have received the largest pluralities
are declared the winners, provided that each has exceeded a legal
minimum. tt 75

Thus, the prefectural candidate can afford to have

competi tion as long
dard for election.

a!

his declared support looms as a durable st

Furthermore, his asserted backing attracts

national candidates who know that if they obtain several of these
pO]itical mainstays in their election districts they can magnify
their election chances. MA common way for a member of the House
of Representatives to create such an organization is to acqUire,
through personal or financial ties, several followers who are active and influential in prefectural politics.,t76
With a basis grounded in rural areas where the

~yo

kusha, who " ••• range in type from men of integrity to those on the
criminal fringe •• ,"77 exploit the traditional
jibans are

ft •••

mores~

constructed

most frequently the stock-in-trade of conservative

75Quigley and Turner, op.cit., p.262
76Ike, op.cit., p.199

77Ibid., p.75
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politicians.~78

Being basically conservative, the Liberal Demo-

crats have a waiting them decided support. "I:t may be assumed that
candidates are less likely to be party affiliated where the hold
of tradition is strong,"19 but conservative bases allow Liberal
Democrats to identify with these "unaffiliated" candidates.
Tn the grass-roots buraku, jiban i. political support
tar removed from any party linkager nevertheless, it is political
support.

When a prefectural leader declares political party af-

filiation, he automatically secures "party affiliation" for hi.
supporters, who remain undeclared.

However, the party of the

leader may repulse his followers causing him to yield his backing
which may be sought by another popular leader.
Liberal Democrats avert much of this changeableness with
their proclaimed

conservatism. These men have usually experienooc

the perplexing conditions of local voting behavior and thus understand what modes to follow in order to sustain support.
Party label remains insignificant even in prefectural
e Ie c t ions .'; s ignifyi ng that c and id ate s do run sa inde p enden ts •
What success do independent candidates currently have as support
systems continue to expand?

In village elections, party labels

do not effect the voting patterns because most people
servative, although not directly for the LDP.

vo~e

con-

Many prefectural

candidates still run unaffiliated which is " ••• evidence of the
7 8steiner, op.cit., p.437.
79Ibid., p.J95.
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public uncertainty about politics,n80

a valid uncertainty since

parties have faile d to related all political ac tivi ties to rural
areas.
In the 1955 elections,

It • • •

98.2 per cent of the elected

town and village assemblymen were independents. This ':droP:ged'
to 95.0 per cent in 1963 • "81

t'Tn 1955 all town and villege as-

sembly seats in Fukui and a 11 but one of the seats in Yamagata,
Ibaraki, Shimane, and Oi ta went to independents .'t82
Many independents claim to have

~onservative

leanings

with small portions claiming Socialist inclinations and several
contending pure independency.

'The role of the independent in

national elections is no longer significant nor is it very meaningful in prefectural

elections~

And to some degree, pure inde-

pendency has been eliminated even though the electoral records
disclose that independents should be holding many political offices in the governmental a s8emb lies. In<i;ependent has becone a
title for candidates not openly affiliated with a political party.
80Neumana, op.cit., p.J39.
81Steiner, op.oitJ"
82Ibid., p.398.

p.398.

CHA.PrER V

FACTIONALISM: TEE LIFEBLOOD OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Buraku conservatism, modified obligational systems, and
potent yet shifty support blocs are the predominant political
traits .found

tod~y'l1n

Japan.

These three elements, collectively

taken, constitute the .foundations of Japan'. factionalized party
system. In their attempts to accomodate the maturing political
individual, the

pi

rliamentary parties are coerced to circulate in

the remotest areas.

Accomplishing this party decentralization

forces the parties to rely heavily upon their factions who are
closer to the changing political person although they are proximate to only a limited portion of the nat ion.
"Shifts in party membership and splintering of parties
are occurring constantly in Japan. But these shifts and splinters
are not caused by the intenaity of political

belief~

and senti-

ments but by the intensity of personal feeling and loyalty to a
leader. u8 3

~he Japanese parties, especially the conservative

parties, may still be described as clusters of leader-follower
groups involved in continuously shifting alliances and with each
group itself undergoing frequent changes.lte,.

Japan's political

parties depend upon factional leaders and their support organizations to demonstrate the political processes to their people.
Electoral Buccess for national parties cannot be delivered

outB~e

83yanaga, op.cit., p.91.
84Neumann, op.cit"

p.339.
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of the factions. On the other hand, "the relative strength of fac
tions within the parties depends largely on the number of Diet
seats the respective factions manage to capture. tt85

Party facti

thus are semi-autonomous, having their own support groups and policies, while simultaneously being connected with national parties
and their respective programs.

When factional leaders lack true

party loyalty they control their cons_ituencies for themselves
alone,. eliminating any partyattiliation.

Should they be affil-

iated and lose their connection through a shift in leadership or
by disassociation, they can offer support to another nationalp .
or remain simply an autonomous grQup.

subsequently, »the faction

within each party must therefore continue to be handled pretty
much as separate parties ••• "86

The national

tion as a mediatory or conciliatory institution ••• f187 in resolving
conflicts between the factions.
The LOP has been blessed with the traditional conservatism of the rural areas which has affeeted the characteristic
bloc voting o

Attracting the rural

bosses~

not entire groups, has

been sufficient because » ••• practically no effort is made in the
recruiting of new party members at the grass-roots level because.
votes can be delivered to the designated candidate. n88
85xawai, op.cit. r p.126.
86Ibid., pp. 114-15.
87Yanaga, op.cit., p.237.
88Ibid., p.254.
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rural leaders are in the fold, the national party can dismiss any
elaborate plans for a local organization. Controlling hierarchal
leaders,es

thoae in the prefectural assemblies, is a more prom-

inent factionalization factor because these leaders manage such
larger voting blocs.
Having controlled the government continuously since

1955

as the LOP and for many years previous through conservative organizations, severa! personalities have constantly pulled heavy
majori ties in the nation, except in some urban areas.

It should

be conclusive that "factionalism in the LDP has neither kept it
from power not paralyzed its action in political crises. n8 9

In

1960, the LOP held 296 seats or 6303 per cent of the entire membership in the House of Representatives.*
Maintaining harmonious relations with each faction ia
difficult because of the

I

emi-autonomous nature of the parties.

This self-governing ability permits rival factions to oonflict in
attempting to finance their respective factions and also to elect
particular faction candidates.
"The lack of a really effective centralized fund-raising
organization in the conservative party haa also contributed to
factionalism, by making individual politicians look primarily to

89Maki, op.cit., p.161

*

From a table found on page 69 in: Robert E. Ward and Roy
C. Macridis,eds., Modern Political sJstema:ASia (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jerseyt Prentice-!811:Inc., 1963 •
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influential political support. '·90

"lloreover, each faction wi thin.

the conservative party has at least one organization bearing some
innocuous or academic title, the real purpose of which i. to
lect political funds~~9l

001-

When the LOP faction seeks influential

patron., they primarily entreat con.ervative individuals with national power.

Because these local entities frequently rely on nat-

ional party funds, their conservative candidates

~ ••• are

likely

to stress their relationship to persons in positions ot power on
the national level, persons who are a lso conservative. "92

Buttres

sing their factional organization with external sources of

fu~

LOP factions tend to represent limited interests which must rely
on the success that the faction earn. at the polls if they are to
be advanced.
"Factionalism within the LOP ••• i. a matter of personalitie •••• "9"

and the financial backing each conservative candidate

csn acquire from hi. factional leader may determine hi. chances
in an election.

An individual candidate can augment the vital

a.sistance; ot his factional leader by running as a n official member of the LOP, unless the factional leader is not strongly con"
nected with the national party.

The principal dilemma which co.-

lervative factions are faced with is which conservative candidate
90gdwin O. Reischauer, Japan: Past and Present (New Yorks
Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p.2bf.
91Soalapino, opocit., p.89.
92steiner, op.cit., p.397.
93vaki, opocit., p.l60.
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to support.
For example: A House of Representa ti ve dis trict in Japan
generally returns from three to five Ddet members in their elections.

Conservatives have repeatedly controlled this House by

tak ing advant age of tradi tionalis.m and affiliated supp·ort orgalli-

zations.

Therefore,Should they attempt to sweep an election dis-

trict or maximize their chances and run only those whom they positively feel will be victorious'
Faction leaders often mwst decide on which candidates
will run.

An LOP incumbent usually has no endorsement problems

because having been elected, his ..... strength becomes s:olidified
until it is mearly impossible to dislodge him from party nomination;"94~ Other aspirants must be selected and finanoed through

the faotion itself and :hlterest groups. The party too may donate
additional funds.

Thirdly, certain conaervatives not allied with

the faction leader or the national party cause supplementary prob
lems by Dominating their own choice.

What can and does invariSbl

occur is that the conservative-based candidates are too

numerous~

thereby diminishing their chances and fomenting struggles with one
another.

Factional control of pertinent districts decreases the

probability of such occurrenoes, but the instability of these organizations permits the possibility to persist.
The IDP has branched its party organizatiol'l hopiBg that
it

~o • • would he~p

to eliminate destructive factional competition

94Lawrence Olson, Dimensions of Ja an (New York: American
University Field Staff, Inc., 1963), p. 730

1

among what remains of rival personal machines of the same party
in each 10cality."95

This rivalry, external to the problems men-

tioned previously within the faction and to the top factional
leader, a lso diminishes con.servative streng"h during the election&
Despite the dependence on unstable factional cooperation
aad the ineffectiveness of national party branching, conservatives
continue to procure majori ties in many districts a tall levels ot
government. ExploitatioR of the traditional socio-political determinants and the conservative

organi~ations

prodUcing mas. vot-

ing has greatly enhanced the LOP position as the leader among Japanese political parties.

Jibsn is the most notorious political

entity of the conservative LOP and its factions.

It has become a

permanent political force through which a candidate not only helps
himself, but helps his fellow party candidates.

Use of the jiban

has been an absorbemt political tool im the rural areas for the
LDP factions.

Conservative leanings which are characteristic in

rural areas must be nursed if they
election

level.~

are~to

be

utiliz~d

Oft

higher

For if the people did not attach this support to

a personality, there would be a distinct "floating'" or un.determined vote.

As long as the LOP can rest assure that they possess

the indubious support for conservatives, they are permitted more
time to politically influemce people in leis conservative areas,
such as the cities. This explicitly depends on the degree of political maturation throughout Japan and the policies promoted by
the LOP and rival parties.
95Kawai, op.cit., p.l29.
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CHAPTER VI
THE EXPENDABILITY OF RURAL CAMPAIGNS

Political campaigns serve as implements for bringing a
candidate into full view of the voters.

Distribution of propa-

gandist pamphlets; statements to the public and retorts of' 0ppolition charges through the mass media; and unceaaing hand-shakiag
and baby-kissing are integral parts of' an election campaign. In
Japan, government regulations are imposed on. political campaigRing
legally limiting the role they playo

On the contrary, these set

rules are easily avoided and overlooked through tactical procedures, making these legalities barely realistic and completely impractical.

The one specific advantage of' government regulation

insofar as the Japanese parties are concerned is that they do offer various free services to the parties as limited numbers of
campaign posters and sponsorship in the mas. media.
Campaigning ia the burakd is practically negligible except when the local candidates visit their oonstttuenoiel in order
to bpief their henohmen (as the yuryokusha)on election trivialities.

~We

may note that in town and village assembly elections

the overwhelming prevalence of the (fixed vote l
the al mOlt complete absence of a

I

-

in other word.,

floating vote t - makes campaign.s

Ultne ce s. aI7 • It 96

"There are also a substantial number of' individuals who
are in efi'ect nothing but robots in the voting process. Such

9 6s'teiner, op.cit., p.4l1

individuals, found most rrequently in agrarian communities,exeroi8e no

judgme~t,

others. "97

but vote according to advioe and instruction

or

The local candidate need not was te time ed run.ds in

conducting any campaign where it has proven to be dispensable, unless vigorous opposition appears.
Absence of active rural campaigning alao enables the LOP
to SUbstantiate their power for the conservatives have more time
and money to distribute among their ractions in insecure or quite
doubtful regions where tlfloatin.g'· votes are numerous.

97Ike, op.oit., p.205.

CHAPTER VII
LIBERAL DErKOCRATS AND SOCIALISTS IN JAPAN TODAY

With the Japanese political process in a definite state
of maturation, party policies are becoming essential in electio.eering, although the force has not as yet truly penetrated rural
area••

t~ecause

of the plurality of interests that people have •••

policies are formulated with great flexibility and ata ted simply!'93
The national parties therefore "do not tell the voters very c1Mui
what they may expect from them."99

Nevertheless, as the Japanese

continue to braoden their political knowledge, explicit policies
are being demanded although political parties are not always accomodating. Just what are the major parties doing to meet this
development and what can be speculated about rural conservatism
and the LDP?
"The fact that both major parties today are in some degree single interest group parties, contribute. in
to political

stability.~lOO

certai~ re.~ta

In accordance with political stabDit,y

aDd growing political modernization, the individual has become
more politically involved independent

~d

knowledgeable and

th~

fore btcreasingly evaluative o During the 1950's, "the individual
was being emaacipated from

traditiona~

98yanaga, opocit., po26l o
99Ibid., p.265.
100Scalapi.o, op.cit., p.71.
101Burks, op.cit~, p.~64.

social

controls."lO~

thus

allowing him to attain his own outlook on politics.

Also, tfthe

decay of the family system accelerates the social and behavioral
shift from an almost collective or family basis to a considerably
more individualized basis. n l02

With this expansio1'1 of political

modernization into the development of actual political thinking,
LOP power should be challenged especially on the grass-roots leve
We may no_ ia.pect both the Socialist and Liberal Democratic Parties in order to peroeive what they

have~compli.hed

in meeting

this changing political society.
"Socialist. are stronger in the cities tham im rural
areas, and with cities growing their total vote can be expected
to increase ••• However, eight millioR vote. still separate the two
parties and how to surpass the 'wall of 01'1e-third' is the
perennial dilemma. Jtl0 3

So~

Even though ttthe leftist vote ••• has beell

growing at a slow but remarkably steady pace ••• "104 ftthe popular
vote for the Socialists has revealed an erratic trend ••• ·'105 This
eocentric course 1'10W leaves the Socialists with a steady, yet diminished vote, f or the Democratic Socialists have completed their
split. The Demooratic Socialists .tand by parliamentary democracy
and a welfare state toullded on the electoral process •. Their right
ist leaning also make!! them fair game for absorptioll by the LDP
102aeardaley, Hall, and Ward, op.cit., p.443.
1030180ll, op.oit., p.397.
lo4Reischauer, op.cit., p.264.
105Maki, £E~.' p.156.
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should their electoral ability prove unsuccessful. In 1963, the
Democratic Socialist. managed to gain six new seats in the House
of Representatives while they lost better tham one per cent of
their already small popular vote.
A second failing of the Socialist Party is their absolute dependence

Oll

sohyo, aa"'amalgama'tion of Japanese trade unio:u.

Thi. group is the lifeblood of socialistic existence although it
" ••• oaJ\Rot produce enough votes for the Sociali.ts to come to pa.r
as a olass party. It 106

There is inten.se factiol\alization even

though the Sooialist. hold to a rigid ideology, a factor which
has ·>made it difficult for them to appeal to other iftterest
groups!~107

outside the labor organizatiOfta. In order for the So-

cialists to re.elve a majority standing they will have to persuade
the DSP baok to their ranks by discarding harsh ideological principles.

Also, naRY Socialist party ••• will have to broade. and

moderate its stand to suchan extent that its formation of a Governme.t will probably Rot represent any fundamental threat to the
conservative forces. ul08
Thirdly, S'ocialists have the minority party stigma."tJB:ino
amy system of party govermment, the party out of power cam

de~op

a considerable seAse of frustration if lORg kept from control of
lo6nr. I.I. Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan
(Londo.: Oxford University Press, 1900), Po4oS.
l07Baerwald, op.cit., p.227.
lo8Morris, op.oit., p.408.
109Maki, op.oit., p.2l9.
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goverrunent."'109 Professor Steiner states:
But in Japan, this frustration is
aggravated because the opposition
feels that it represents the politically conscious and the articulate segment of the populatiom
and that the 'public opinion' it
represents is constantly disregarded by the ruling party which COAtrols the masses of politically unsophisticated rural voters and is
able to exercise its power without
regard for the correctness or incorrect.ess of its policies.110
A.other factor coatributiRg to Socialist inability to
generate stronger vote appeal is that Hneither the new generatioa
of youag voters, not the

peop~

moving into the rapidly expanding

urban areas ••• seem to be nearly as

favorabl~

inclined toward the

Socialisrs as they might have been expected to be. Hlll
the ties of traditional society is

ROW

BrealdRg

affecting political uader-

standing for each individual who seeks it. But, the ideology supported by the Sooialists, which talks of "Marx and neutrality,
power politics, and the American tenemyJttl12 has met with disfavor
thereby pushing ideologically untinged LOP policies into the politi6al limelight sim.ce they represent a broad spectrum with which
to identify.
Summarily, the Socialists do not attract

tt •••

suffieie

large numbers of mea who have iRflueRce aad standing in their
llO$teiner, op.cit., p.467.
lll ... .rapan's Frustrated Socialists 't Economist CXCVlr (Novembel)
1990), p.798 o
_',f.? \ ,;,

.,.,.t,:)'~

l12Ibld., p.798.
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communities."113

Especially in the eroding, traditional buraku

oommunities they would seem to have had sUccess yet the conservative vote patterns persist.

Detaohing the LDP from control

o~

Japanese government does .ot seem likely unless the Socialists
can ally themselves with all other parties. Even then, this amalgamation would aooount for a minority positioa.
Liberal Democrats have been a1\ entreached majority in
the national legislature aRd other governmental levels since the
Occupation terminated the hauDting militarism characteristic
pre-war and war-time days.

o~

They have pereeived the effects of

the Allied Occupatio. and the democratio institutibRs and policies
condoliled for Japanese society.

Political moderniZ',ation, inaugu-

rated in the late 194o! s and early 1950' s, consis ted of a

tt • • •

search for Rew methodological principles ••• and development of socal~d undeveloped areas ••• tt ll4

Modernization could only be ac-

complished by uBsettliag traditional behavior, especially i1\ the
rural areas.

Some tradition had to be preserved in order to alOid

complete confusion end probable defeat of any new measures. Whatever changes have taken hold, the LOP remains in control of Japauese goverame.t with a fairly strong hand.
During the 1950's, attempts were made to break doWR the
rigid traditionalism of rural Japan with hope that the individual
~ould

escape the group consciousness which perpetuated familial
l13Ike, opoci!., p.176.

l14R.E. Ward, "Political Modernization and culture i. JapaJl't
World PQlitics XV (July, 1963), p.569.
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cohesiveDess.

Imdividuality has beem stressed together with po-

litical maturation for the inte.tioR
and politically.

or

advaRcing Japan socially

What has beea the effect on bUraku lire and tra

ditio.al conservatism!
~8ost

buraku inhabitants admit that there is less cohe-

sion thrua there used to be, and the older generations frequently
complain about the unrest, disobedience, and non-comformist views
and practices of the youllger people.ttllS

The familial system is

gradually decayimg thus causing " ••• the sooial amd behavioral
shift from an almost completely col19 ctive or family basis to a
CORS

iderab ly more ind i vidual ize d bas is." 116

What has this imposed

om the political situation i. the buraku?
"The slack resultimg from the weakeDing of traditional
behavior patterl'ls has to be taken up by me'll types of appeals ad
by the oraatioB

or

local party

organizations.~117

The toP has

challeaged this trend by instituting agrarian rerorms and by centralizing their party organizatioa, thereby reinforcing the co.servative commitment in the burakus. "Limited in occupatio. and
living area, apathetic and resignedoo,"ll8 the buraku people remain partially isolated

from modernization.

ll5steimer, 2Pocit., p.224o
ll6Beardsley, Hall, amd Ward, op.cit., p.J+43o
l17steiDer, opocit., p.228.
l180lso., op.cit.~ p.73.
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Despite their ftumerical decline
and i~fl1tratio. of Roa-agrarian
ele meltts irlto their midst, Japanese farmers still are a supremely
importaftt political bloc for the
conservative cause. They cORtlnue
to represeBt the largest single
socio-eooRomic category of voters
by a considerable measuree ll 9
.tMost Japanese are still con.servative, but this does
not

mean~that

they n.ecessarily approve of what conservative can-

didates do after they are elec1Jed. tt120

(This is Olson's summary

of 1960 election patterns-patterns currently in effect).

As

the

people become wary of LDP activities they are /llpt to exercise
their political

i~dividuality

at the polls, discarding traditional

behavior in favor of an appeal to policy. Siace opposing parties
have remained doctrinaire (as the Socialists and Commuaists) or
do not have sufficient support as yet (as the Democratic Socialfu_
and Komeito), the LOP has partially filled the gap by presentiltg
new faces of political leadership through their faction-ridden
organization.

This has caused further rift among LOP members to-

day as Prime MiRister Sato continues to struggle with conflicting
party members and segme.ts of the matioRal population.
The Liberal Democratic Party continues its reign as

C~

troller of Japanese governmeBt, a role which still defies true
consideratioD. of a upublic illterest."

Not everyone participates

in the political process .or benefits from its
ll9Scalapiao, op.cit., p.90.
1200lson, op.cit., p.227.

activities.~li~al
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parties leave something to be desired as main instruments in Japanese politics.

It can 0111'1 be comcluded that

ft: • • •

Japan has not

attained a full measure of political modernizatlon. rt121
121Ward aDd Rustow, op.cit., p.410 o
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